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Chapter Eight 
Thomas Hobbes on the 
Aristocracy of Passion 
Geoffrey M. Vaughan 
Nothing would seem to be further from Hobbes's psychology of man than 
the notion of an aristocratic soul. He is widely considered the first of the 
bourgeois philosophers.1 As for an aristocratic soul itself—the magnanimous 
man of Aristotle, for instance—Hobbes had many reasons to be hostile to this 
idea. The very notion of a great man, as someone above the common herd, 
presented a danger to his entire political project because that man was moti­
vated by pride. A proud man might consider himself immune to danger and 
thus not be motivated by the fear of violent death. And without that fear, how 
can civil society hold itself together? Curiously, Hobbes did suggest that 
there is an aristocratic alternative to fear, namely "a glory or pride in appear­
ing not to need to break" one's contract. And so it seems the aristocratic soul 
does exist. All that Hobbes could say against it in this context is that it is "too 
rarely found to be presumed on." And so what should appear to be a theoreti­
cal possibility, the aristocratic soul, turns out to be only a practical problem. 
Or so it seems. 
This paper will explore the idea of aristocracy in the work of Thomas 
Hobbes from both a political and a psychological perspective, for the two are 
largely inseparable. I first consider the phenomenon of aristocracy at a gener­
al level before turning to Hobbes's thoughts on it. I do this to show that he 
had a unique perspective on the problems of aristocracy. I then explore 
Michael Oakeshott's suggestion that there can be found an "aristocratic 
mood" in Hobbes's work. This is followed by what 1 describe as Hobbes's 
replacement of the classical aristocracy of virtue with his own aristocracy of 
passion. I conclude with a few thoughts on the cultural benefits of such an 
aristocracy and its political dangers. 
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THE ARISTOCRATIC APPEAL AND ITS DANGERS 
Aristocracy as rule by the best has always been a tempting possibility. Plato's 
Socrates claimed that one of the most compelling reasons to rule is that the 
wise man would not be ruled by an inferior. But aristocracy also promises 
both competent government and an escape from the concerns of governing. 
As to the latter, the wisdom of Homer Simpson must be cited on this point. In 
one episode he explains to his daughter, "Lisa, the whole reason we have 
elected officials is so we don't have to think all the time."2 The Homeric 
perspective of this comment is exactly what Rousseau opposed when he 
wrote "On the Social Contract." But few really want to be Rousseauian 
citizens, flying to the assembly each day. As Pierre Manent has explained, 
the political energies of the ancient Greek democracies burnt themselves out 
in the Peloponnesian war, as did the French energies in its revolutionary 
wars.3 Far better to leave this work to others while we get along with our 
lives. The success of the progressive movement in the twentieth century 
owes no small part to the same sentiment. Expertise and competence are 
virtues in the running of a complex, modern state. While this might run the 
risk of confusing meritocracy with aristocracy, the ambiguity is as old as the 
treatments of Plato and Aristotle. Socrates described the star-gazing philoso­
pher as the best pilot of the ship of state,4 and Aristotle argued that only those 
with sufficient leisure could cultivate the virtues necessary for rule. -
The standard objections to aristocracy are threefold. The first problem is 
how to identify the initial group of aristocrats. Who stands out as better than 
all the rest? Who can be trusted with such power? One of the fundamental 
problems every political society faces, and one that the state of nature theo­
rists described so vividly, is that there is no clear way of identifying natural 
rulers. Even those outstanding figures whom we might consider to have the 
unambiguous qualities of leadership—George Washington and Winston 
Churchill come to mind—were not universally considered the natural rulers 
they are today. Washington still had to fight the Revolutionary war and 
convince the Continental Congress to supply his needs; Churchill was denied 
the office he so craved until the last moment. Yet this objection, the problem 
of identification, is a practical one. It does not deny the existence of aristo­
cratic souls who are natural rulers. It simply says it is difficult to find them in 
the first instance. 
The second objection to aristocracy is also a practical one, yet no less 
important. As described in Plato's Republic, regimes degenerate when subse­
quent generations do not have the virtues of the founding aristocrats. Even if 
we could find natural rulers at the founding of the state, it is not clear that 
their progeny will have the same qualities. The wastrel son is cliche from 
ancient warrior cultures to modern business. Yet it is not even clear that the 
first generation, the aristocrats, want their progeny to follow them. In a 
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telling passage in a letter from John Adams to Abigail, one of those founders 
of a new order for the ages, he described his hope that their sons would not 
be men like himself and would not be engaged in politics, and this even more 
the case for successive generations.6 He hoped for a succession of genera­
tions that moved further and further away from the concerns that so dominat­
ed his life and have made him a figure of fascination and even veneration. 
The third standard objection to aristocracy is that it seems incapable of 
discovering suitable candidates from outside the official lists. While also a 
practical problem, this one is concerned not so much with the quality of rule 
is with the fairness or justice, or rather injustice, of excluding those who 
should be included within the aristocracy. Again, Plato's Republic is the 
classical expression of this concern and also of the unwieldy mechanisms 
that would be required to address it. Of course, the modern political world 
has come up with its own means of addressing it, namely, through elections. 
Although few today would understand how the ancient Greeks were able to 
consider elections fundamentally aristocratic, the claim of the candidates and 
their supporters is always based on rank, that is, better and worse, the very 
language of aristocracy. Ironically, then, modern representative democracy 
resolves the problem of aristocracy by re-creating it in a roundabout way. 
The epistolary conversation between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson is a 
good example of how this is done. Although separated by significant differ­
ences on the matter, they both believed that there was a natural aristocracy to 
be found among the American people and that the institutions of government 
had to be designed in such a way as to find them out. And so the author of the 
Declaration of Independence and the author of the Constitution of Massachu­
setts late in life supported the American Revolution for its ability to address 
this third problem with aristocracy. 
HOBBES AGAINST THE ARISTOCRACY 
Although Hobbes preferred monarchy above all other forms of government, 
there are places in which it is clear that he was open to both aristocracy and 
democracy. His preference for monarchy was more practical than theoretical, 
it being his concern that the most significant problem in governments is not 
that the wrong decision might be made but that a sufficiently large number of 
people would argue about any decision. The so-called Ship Money Contro­
versy that preceded the English Civil War is a good case in point. According 
to the laws of England the crown could impose a special tax throughout the 
country for the purpose of outfitting the Navy. Charles I tried to exercise this 
right in 1628 and, although the Commons was prorogued, the people ob­
jected. In themselves, the objections to the ship money might not have led to 
the Civil War. However, Hobbes believed that they did give a pretext for 
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other, unstated complaints against the King and, indeed, against monarchy in 
general. Whether it was the final straw or a rallying point, it is true that in 
politics unlikely events often cause greater ones. On Hobbes's telling, the 
English Civil War was caused by people believing they had a right to object 
to the decisions of the king. They were strengthened in this belief by the 
existence of Parliament, an institution dedicated, it would have seemed to 
Hobbes, to frustrating the king. As Michael Walzer put it, "The good aristo­
crat indeed consents to the laws he obeys; that is why he obeys them; but he 
has at the same time nothing to say about their substance."7 
According to Hobbes, almost all political opposition can be traced back to 
pride. Civil wars do not arise from people simply having different ideas. 
They arise when people think that their ideas about government or policy are 
as good as or better than those of the duly appointed rulers. But why should 
anybody think that? Pride. His whole science of politics points to the creation 
of the great Leviathan, that which will overawe the people and, referring to 
the book of Job, will be "king over the children of pride."8 Pride is the great 
enemy of the Leviathan because it undercuts the very mechanism of obedi­
ence. The Hobbesian state is supposed to work not because the sovereign 
always reaches the right conclusion or chooses the best policy. That is too 
much to ask of human politics. Rather, the Hobbesian state works when 
everyone obeys the sovereign, right or wrong. Indeed, there is no right or 
wrong except for what the sovereign says, according to Hobbes.9 To presume 
to apply those terms—right and wrong—to anything the sovereign might do 
is to place oneself in a position of judgement above the sovereign. And what 
is this other than pride? 
It is no accident that however much each of his various lists of the laws of 
nature might vary, one from another, they always include a law against pride. 
This is significant because it r eveals Hobbes's theoretical objections to aris­
tocracy as opposed to the practical objections considered earlier. Recall, the 
three objections revolve around finding an initial group of aristocrats, sus­
taining their qualities through subsequent generations, and including qual­
ified people from outside the initial list. Nowhere did Hobbes deny that these 
are problems. He was as aware of them is anyone. Instead, he would suggest 
that these three problems arise precisely because of pride. They are practical 
problems only because of this underlying theoretical or psychological prob­
lem. Everyone values himself higher than he does his fellows.10 Therefore, 
everyone wants to be counted among the aristocrats or, if not everyone, far 
too many to fit within their ranks.11 And this is not an unreasonable ambition. 
Not only are the rewards of being an aristocrat far greater than those of being 
an average citizen, Hobbes told us that the distinctions of rank are arbitrary: 
"The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer 
Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequal-
lity that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill."12 If it is arbitrary 
Thomas Hobbes on theAristocracy of Passion 189 
who will be the lord of the manor or the serf,13 then what rational person 
would not want to be at the top?14 And so the vanity or pride that creates the 
initial problem becomes contagious. Even people who might not have started 
with it soon acquire it.15 
Having lived in two countries characterized by the pathology of pride, 
Hobbes could see that any civil society that relies upon this is inherently 
unstable. As he wrote in De Cive, "no large or lasting society can be based 
upon the passion for glory. The reason is that glorying, like honour, is noth­
ing if everybody has it, since it consists in comparison and preeminence."16 
Any society based upon a zero-sum game is setting up conflict. According to 
Julie Cooper, "By Hobbes's admission, laws of honor may frustrate the end 
for which they were established—namely, peace—for they are liable to exac­
erbate, rather than redirect, the passion of vainglory."17 Moreover, such hier­
archies can never be entirely rigid for they must always, and do always, 
permit new members to enter. Where the rewards for entry are so great, as I 
have stated, there are countless political and psychological incentives for 
each individual to rise into the ranks of the aristocracy. Aristocracy is noth­
ing but a problem. 
There seems to be one exception to this problem of aristocracy, as many 
commentators have pointed out, namely Sidney Godolphin. Godolphin died 
early in the Civil Wars fighting for the Royalist cause and Hobbes dedicated 
Leviathan to his brother, Francis. The character of Sidney enters into a dis­
cussion of aristocracy because Hobbes praised him in both the Epistle Dedi­
catory and the Review and Conclusion to Leviathan. Accordingly, Hobbes 
wrote, "For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service 
of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friend­
ship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by 
necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous 
constitution of his nature."18 In the last few pages of his great book, Hobbes 
used the example of his late friend as evidence that there is "no such Incon­
sistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think."19 Did Sidney 
Godolphin allow Hobbes to square the circle of aristocracy as he would 
shortly claim but fail to do in geometry?20 
Godolphin—either one, but especially Sidney—was a very unusual de­
dicatee for Hobbes. As Richard Tuck points out, Hobbes was trying to ac­
commodate himself to the new powers in England in his "Review and Con­
clusion."21 Choosing to dedicate the book to a prominent Royalist would 
seem to be a mistake. Clarendon noted this and concluded that Hobbes chose 
to dedicate the book in order to secure the £200 bequest from Sidney that 
Francis had not yet paid. John T. Scott has given the question of Hobbes's 
relationship to Godolphin sustained attention, framing it in terms of friend­
ship rather than aristocracy. Nevertheless, his work is significant for drawing 
attention to the fact that Hobbes praised his late friend for the "quite un-
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Hobbesian virtues of courage and friendship."22 Scott's conclusion is that, 
"Godolphin's loyalty to the king and his friendship for Hobbes seem to 
transcend the vision of human nature Hobbes offers in his work. 23 While I 
am inclined to agree with Scott about Hobbes's vision of human nature, and 1 
do not doubt their friendship, I am not convinced that Godolphin rises to the 
level of an aristocratic soul. Hobbes's description of the man is sufficiently 
bourgeois to prevent that. What he was, significantly, was a poet. I shall 
return to this below. 
HOBBES AND THE FEW 
Michael Oakeshott has argued that Thomas Hobbes had, even if he did not 
fully develop it, an aristocratic mood in his argument. He described it as an 
idiom of morality that was appropriate to creatures "more properly concerned 
with honour than with either survival or prosperity."24 Oakeshott's argument, 
which he admitted was speculative, would put Hobbes in a line of thought 
shared with Spinoza and Hume wherein pride or self-esteem is enough to 
bring men to heel.25 He based his argument upon a few scattered but very 
important passages in Leviathan. The first concerns Hobbes s explanation for 
why men might perform their covenants: "either a Feare of the consequence 
of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to break 
it."26 In the subsequent chapter Hobbes explained, "That which gives to 
humane Actions their relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallant-
nesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for 
the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise."27 The last of the 
three comments, coming from chapter 27 of Leviathan, has Hobbes arguing 
that above all other passions fear is the one that prevents men from commit­
ting crimes, "accepting some generous natures."28 Who are these generous 
natures? They certainly seem to be the same ones who would perform their 
contracts because of glory or pride and thereby attain that nobleness or gal-
lantness of courage. If there is such thing as an aristocratic soul in the philos­
ophy of Thomas Hobbes it is to be found in these passages. 
According to Oakeshott, and I certainly agree with him on this, Hobbes's 
problem is that there are not enough of these aristocratic souls to form a 
stable Commonwealth. Certainly, if enough men were so concerned with 
their honor that they would never break their covenants, everyone else could 
perform theirs without fear of the consequences of nonperformance on the 
part of the other. He addressed exactly this possibility: 
For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation 
of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them 
all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then 
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there neither would be, nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common­
wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.29 
James Madison would later make the same argument, if more poetically, in 
Federalist 51: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on govern­
ment would be necessary." Unfortunately, and in Hobbes own words, "this 
later is a Generosity to rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the 
pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest 
part of Mankind."30 Where I cannot follow Oakeshott is his next step, in 
which he attempts to explain this most recent passage from Hobbes in the 
following way: "In short, Hobbes perceived that men lack passion rather than 
reason, and lack, above all, this passion."31 This goes too far. I must, instead, 
agree with Gabriella Slomp that, "in all his political writings Hobbes regards 
desire of glory either as the only or at least as one of the chief destabilizing 
forces in human interactions."32 
On the one hand, readers of Hobbes could agree that were pride instead of 
fear the passion that could most easily be relied upon to enforce contracts, 
Hobbes would have used that in his argument. And yet, as even Oakeshott 
must admit, he did not do so. Hobbes consistently advocated the use of fear 
to motivate the enforcement of covenants rather than pride.33 Yes, there does 
seem to be some small indication, or perhaps an indication of some small 
number, of aristocratic souls—and we owe a debt to Oakeshott for drawing 
this to our attention. It does not follow, however, that the smallness of their 
number is the only problem in appealing to their pride. Oakeshott's presenta­
tion of these proud and gallant men who would keep their covenants as a 
matter of honor, while very much in line with Hobbes's own presentation of 
them in the three passages cited, is lifeless. Pride here is an easy-going self-
confidence. It is more akin to self-esteem as we might use it now.34 Never­
theless, Oakeshott seems to have confused the state of nature and the state of 
seminar, not unlike Rawls would do later. The children of this kind of pride 
would never need a king over them for they would be able to govern them­
selves. 
Despite my disagreement with Oakeshott's analysis, he points to a very 
important and perhaps new understanding of aristocracy. When I addressed 
the issue above and in terms of the classical tradition, aristocrats deserve the 
title of "the best" from their virtues, whether moral or intellectual. What 
Oakeshott draws to our attention, instead, is an aristocracy of passion. That 
is, cognitive and moral superiority is not an issue; rather, passion or the 
balance of various passions one against the other makes aristocrats. Again, 
while I do not agree with Oakeshott's suggestion that pride is a better enforc­
er of contracts than fear, or even to imagine such a thing within Hobbes's 
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philosophy, I do think the aristocracy of passion is an important way to 
understand how Hobbes might have conceived of an aristocratic soul. 
THE ARISTOCRACY OF PASSION 
It is generally accepted, and rightly so, that the concept of a soul is incompat­
ible with Hobbes's materialist, mechanistic philosophy. He famously dis­
missed the notion that the human soul is an incorporeal body with the sug­
gestion that it is really a "thin aereall" body.35 At several points in Leviathan 
he argued that every reference to the soul in Scripture was merely a reference 
to life, the activity or presence of life, rather than to any particular or separate 
thing in itself.36 The only place in his work where the soul meant anything 
real was when he used it as an analogy for the sovereign in the state. In his 
extended analogy in the Introduction to Leviathan he wrote that"Soveraignty 
is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body."37 But 
there is no such thing, as far as I can find in his work, as a natural soul. 
Instead, in place of a unified soul animating the human being, Hobbes argued 
that the passions fill this role. 
In chapter 6 of Leviathan, "Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Mo­
tions; commonly called the Passions. And the Speeches by which they are 
expressed," Hobbes took what were for him curiously tentative steps towards 
the conclusion that all interior motions begin with the passions. First, he 
stated that "the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary 
Motion."38 Then he explained that the small beginnings of motion within the 
human person are called endeavor. Endeavor is divided into the positive 
(appetite or desire), or the negative (aversion).39 These are further subdi­
vided. Only later in the chapter are they clearly identified as passions. He 
wrote, "These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, 
Joy, and Griefe, have their names for diverse conditions diversified."40 The 
significance of the passions for our topic of aristocracy and the aristocratic 
soul can be found in chapter 8 of Leviathan. 
According to Hobbes, natural intelligence consists of two parts, namely, 
"Celerity of Imagining," and "steddy direction to some approved end."41 
This echoes a parallel passage from the Elements of Law, in which he wrote, 
"The difference therefore of wits hath its original from the different passions, 
and from the ends to which their appetite leadeth them."42 Any distinction 
we might ascribe to an aristocratic soul, such as superior virtue or intelli­
gence, are to be found in the peculiar object or vehemence of the individual's 
passions. More precisely, "The Passions that most of all cause the differences 
of Wit, principally, the more or less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowl­
edge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of 
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but several sorts of Power."43 
Thomas Hobbes on theAristocracy of Passion 193 
The continuation of this line of thought in the next paragraph is especially 
instructive. Hobbes continued, "And therefore, a man who has no great Pas­
sion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may 
be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offense; yet he cannot 
possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgment." If there is ever to be 
found an aristocratic mood in Hobbes's philosophy, as Oakeshott put it, it is 
here. Not only did Hobbes identify greatness with great passion, he identified 
mediocrity with indifference. One would expect Hobbes to have preferred 
the passionless, inoffensive, little man who is likely to obey all laws. He did 
not, and that is telling. 
Telling too, however, is the fact that Hobbes did not seek to found his 
new politics on the passionate man he seemed to admire. And this is not 
simply because there were too few of them. Even a society entirely consist­
ing of these aristocratic passions would not serve Hobbes's purpose. The 
problem is the variability of their object as well as the intensity of the pas­
sions. Recall from above, the aristocratic passions he identified are all in­
volved in the quest for power, power in its various forms. Individuals with 
strong passions therefore feel more strongly that "perpetuall and restlesse 
desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death."44 This is why 
Hobbes only seems to be caught in a bind in Leviathan where he attributes to 
vainglorious men both ostentatious inaction and "rash engaging."45 He is not 
caught in a bind because vainglory can lead to both. This has nothing to do 
with his rhetorical exaggeration that vainglory is a form of madness.46 Rath­
er, in human society power can be achieved through bluffing, which he 
describes as ostentation without attempt. At other times rashness will pay off. 
As in all things in Hobbes's world, this is a calculation the individual must 
make. The timorous man will venture very little, the passionate man quite a 
bit more, perhaps more than he ought. The problem for Hobbes is that so 
long as men must make this calculation it will be made entirely on the basis 
of the idiosyncratic intensity of their passions. There is no way to predict or 
guarantee what men will do. This is why he must rely upon fear. 
HOBBES'S ARISTOCRATIC SOUL 
There is a place for the aristocratic soul in Hobbes's philosophical work. It is, 
course, a very different place from the classical conception because his is an 
aristocracy of passion rather than virtue. The passionate man is neither a 
cool, collected Stoic nor an Epicurean with four aces. Yet neither is he an 
erotic soul on the model of Plato's philosopher. The man of great passion that 
Hobbes found so much more interesting than the "indifferent" man was 
interesting precisely because he had more "wit." These were the ones with a 
greater desire for power, riches, knowledge, and honor. But in the new aris-
194 Chapter 8 
tocracy the objects of their passion are no longer, or should no longer be, 
political. As Leo Strauss observed, "At the end of this process there is, 
however, not only the establishment of a peculiarly bourgeois morality, but 
at the same time aristocratic virtue itself becomes sublimated and spiritual­
ized."47 
A good example of the new type of aristocrat may be Hobbes's one-time 
employer, Francis Bacon. According to Hobbes, Bacon died as a result of a 
rash experiment in food preservation. The story is preserved by John Aubrey 
as follows: 
Mr. Hobbs told me that the cause of his lordship's death was trying an experi­
ment: viz., as he was taking the aire in a coach with Dr. Witherborne (a 
Scotchman, Physitian to the King) towards High-gate, snow lay on the ground, 
and it came into my lord's thoughts, why flesh might not be preserved in snow, 
as in salt. They were resolved they would try the experiment presently. They 
alighted out of the coach, and went into a poore woman's howse at the bottome 
of Highgate hill, and bought a hen, and made the woman exenterate it, and 
then stuffed the bodie with snow, and my lord did help to doe it himselfe. The 
snow so chilled him, that he immediately fell so extremely ill, that he could not 
returne to his lodgings (I suppose then at Grave's Inne), but went to the earle 
of Arundell's house at High-gate, where they putt him into a good bed warmed 
with a panne, but it was a damp bed that had not been layn-in in about a yeare 
before, which gave him such a cold that in 2 or 3 dayeS; as I remember he told 
me, he dyed of suffocation.48 
Scholars have suggested a number of problems with this story. For one, this 
carriage ride was supposed to have taken place in April, when there is little 
snow. Additionally, he seems to have been ill months earlier. Jardine and 
Stewart also suggest that Bacon was experimenting on ways to preserve his 
own life, not poultry, when he died. His correspondence lends some credence 
to this conclusion, which makes Hobbes's revision even more interesting.49 
Whatever may be the exact details of Bacon's death, we should be more 
concerned that Hobbes wanted this story recorded by Aubrey. What does it 
tell us? It tells us of a man so driven to experiment that he lost his life. As 
such, it may be the first romantic account of the scientist in modern literature. 
In Hobbes's account of Bacon's death the romance of science is more 
broadly a romance of passion. The passionate artist of word, sound, or paint 
has become a commonplace. For example, George Orwell listed "sheer ego­
ism" as the first of his four reasons in "Why I Write." In that same essay he 
described a writer as "a person whose most absorbed and passionate hours 
are spent arranging words on pieces of paper." Beethoven may provide an 
even more compelling example. Consider the following from his diaries, 
"Live alone in your art! Restricted though you be by your defective sense, 
this is still the only existence for you."50 Earlier, his passion for music was 
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all that kept him alive, "Such experiences brought me to the verge of de­
spair—but little more and I should have put an end to my life. Art, art alone 
deterred me."51 The image of the deaf Beethoven agonizing over composing 
music he could never hear is better explained by Hobbes than by Aristotle. 
Our cultural life is immeasurably richer because of these aristocrats of pas­
sion. The irony is that our politics may be much worse, a fate Hobbes would 
have deplored. 
We live in a world characterized by passion. Passionate leaders are 
sought, pursuing one's passion is considered the height of human fulfillment, 
and political education has become a matter of affect and emotion rather than 
duty or right. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, "... for equality they 
have an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion; they want equality in 
freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they still want it in slavery."52 Hobbes's 
conception has triumphed and we are in many ways the beneficiaries of 
aristocrats of passion, especially in the sciences and the arts, that is, outside 
of politics. Unfortunately, the passionate campaigner for one cause or an­
other has become a cliche because passion has become a substitute for virtue. 
And while some campaigns are far better than others, passion is measured 
more in its intensity than in its object. As a result, the most passionate 
politics from the French to the Cultural Revolution have not produced the 
peaceful societies Hobbes sought. We must remember, of course, that he did 
not want the politics of aristocratic passion. He wanted the politics of fear. 
But his work contained within it a view of nobility, an understanding of the 
aristocratic soul that would unleash wars beyond his imagining. 
NOTES 
1. For a list of commentators from the first half of the twentieth century who hold his 
position, see Keith Thomas. "Social Origins of Hobbes' Political Thought," in Hobbes Studies, 
ed. Keith Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 344-439 (Bk.4). An updated and more targeted 
list would include Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory 
(London: Macmillan, 2000); Julie E. Cooper, "Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the 
Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes," The Review of Politics 72(2010): 241-69; Haig Patapan, 
'"Lord over the Children of Pride': The Vaine-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes's Leviathan," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 33, no. 1 (2000): 74-93. 
2. Bob Anderson, "Bart's Comet," in The Simpsons, ed. David Mirkin (Fox Broadcasting 
Network, 1995). 
3. Pierre Manent, The Metamorphoses of the City, trans. Marc LePain (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 43. 
4. Plato, "Republic, Volume I: Books 1-5," in Loeb Classical Library 237, ed. Christopher 
Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 339—43. 
5. Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
70-71. 
6. John Adams, "Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, Post 12 May 1780 [Electronic 
Edition]," in Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive (Massachusetts Historical Society). 
196 Chapter 8 
I. Michael Walzer, "Good Aristocrats / Bad Aristocrats: Thomas Hobbes and Early Mod­
ern Political Culture," in In the Presence of the Past, ed. R. T. Bienvenu and M. Feingold 
(Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 46. 
8. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 221. 
9. See especially Hobbes, Leviathan, 124. 
10. So concerned with pride was Hobbes that in both De Cive and Leviathan (but not The 
Elements of Law) he set aside a specific law of nature against it (number 8 in De Cive, number 
9 in Leviathan). While I cannot expand upon this here, it is worthwhile to note that the law of 
nature against pride does not address vain glory. The passion of vain glory is, for Hobbes, 
addressed in the law of nature against revenge, which does appear in all three accounts. 
I I .  C f .  De Cive I.ii where Hobbes makes a somewhat stronger argument that people enter 
society first and foremost for honor. See Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and 
Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
12. Hobbes, Leviathan, 107. 
13. Hobbes would no doubt object, but it is difficult to ignore the similarity with the words 
of John Ball, the radical priest of the Peasants' Revolt: "When Adam delved and Eve span, 
Who was then a gentleman?" See Cooper, "Vainglory , Modesty , and Political Agency," 249. 
14. Despite John Rawls' reservations about Hobbes, this calculation is entirely in keeping 
with his rational decision-making in the original position. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 11 n.4. 
15. Consider, for instance, Aristotle's account of the development of democracy in Athens: 
"For because the people were the cause of [Athenian] naval supremacy during the Persian wars, 
they began to have high thoughts and to obtain mean persons as popular leaders when they 
were opposed politically by t he respectable." See Aristotle, Politics, 84 (1274al 0—15). 
16. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 24 (I.ii). 
17. Cooper, "Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency," 258. 
18. Hobbes, Leviathan, 3. 
19. Hobbes, Leviathan, 484. 
20. For the story of Hobbes's attempt to square the circle and John Wallis' spirited rebuttal, 
see Douglas M. Jesseph, Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
21. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572—1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1993), 335. 
22. John T. Scott, "Godolphin and the Whale: Friendship and the Framing of Hobbes' 
Leviathan," in Love and Friendship: Rethinking Politics and Affection in Modern Times, ed. 
Eduardo A. Velasquez (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 120. 
23. "Godolphin and the Whale," 135. 
24. Michael Oakeshott, "The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes," in Hobbes on 
Civil Association (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 1975), 133. 
25. Oakeshott, 131. 
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, 99. 
27. Hobbes, Leviathan, 104. 
28. Hobbes, Leviathan, 206. 
29. Hobbes, Leviathan, 118-19. 
30. Hobbes, Leviathan, 99. 
31. Oakeshott, 132. 
32. Gabriella Slomp, "From Genus to Species: The Unravelling of Hobbesian Glory," Histo­
ry of Political Thought 19(1998): 559. 
33. See, for instance, Hobbes, Leviathan, 90, 97-99, 117, 138, and 206. The same point is 
made in De Cive, with the addition that fear is a sufficient reason to break a contract in the state 
of nature. See On the Citizen, 37 (Il.xi). 
34. Research on the relation of self-esteem to violence, however, seems to bear out a 
straightforward Hobbesian reading. See Brad J.Bushman and Roy F. Baumeister, Threatened 
Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-Love or 
Self-Hate Lead to Violence?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75, no. 1 (1 998): 
Thomas Hobbes on theAristocracy of Passion 197 
219-29; Roy F. Baumeister, Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, "Relation of Threatened 
Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem," Psychological 
Review 103, no. 1 (1996): 5-33. 
35. Hobbes, Leviathan, 77. 
36. Hobbes, Leviathan, 311, 425f. 
37. Hobbes, Leviathan, 9; cf. On the Citizen, 88-89. 
38. Hobbes, Leviathan, 38. 
39. Hobbes, Leviathan, 38. 
40. Hobbes, Leviathan, 41. 
41. Hobbes, Leviathan, 50. 
42. Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tonnies (New 
York, NY: Barnes and Noble, 1969), 49. 
43. Hobbes, Leviathan, 53. 
44. Hobbes, Leviathan, 70. 
45. Hobbes, Leviathan, 72. See also Cooper, "Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency," 
247ff. 
46. See Hobbes, Leviathan, 54; Elements of Law, 51. 
47. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, trans. Elsa M. 
Sinclair (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50. 
48. John Aubrey, Brief Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 76. 
49. See, for instance, Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life 
of Francis Bacon (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1999). 
50. Ludwig von Beethoven, Beethoven: The Man and the Artist, as Revealed in His on 
Words, ed. Friedrich Kerst and Henry Edward Krehbiel, trans. B. W. Huebesch (New York, 
NY: Dover Publications, 2011). 
51. Heiligenstadt Testament, Oct. 6, 1802. XXX. 
52. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 482. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, John. "Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, Post 12 May 1780 [Electronic 
Edition]." In Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive: Massachusets Historical Soci­
ety. 
Anderson, Bob. "Bart's Comet." In The Simpsons, edited by David Mirkin: Fox Broadcasting 
Network, 1995. 
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
Aubrey, John. Brief Lives. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898. 
Baumeister, Roy F., Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden. "Relation of Threatened Egotism to 
Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem." Psychological Review 103, 
no. 1 (1996): 5-33. 
Beethoven, Ludwig von. Beethoven: The Man and the Artist, as Revealed in His on Words. 
Translated by B. W Huebesch. edited by Friedrich Kerst and Henry Edward Krehbiel New 
York, NY: Dover Publications, 2011. 
Cooper, Julie E. "Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the Political Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes." The Review of Politics 72 (2010): 241-69. 
Hobbes, Thomas. The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, edited by Ferdinand TOnnies New 
York, NY: Barnes and Noble, 1969. 
. Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
. On the Citizen, edited by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1998. 
J. Bushman, Brad, and Roy F. Baumeister. "Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and 
Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?" Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 75, no. 1 (1998): 219-29. 
198 Chapter 8 
Jardine, Lisa, and Alan Stewart. Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon. New 
York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1999. 
Jesseph, Douglas M. Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallis Chicago, IL. 
University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Manent, Pierre. The Metamorphoses of the City. Translated by Marc LePain. Cambridge, MA. 
Harvard University Press, 2013. 
Oakeshott, Michael. "The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes." In Hobbes on Civil 
Association, 133. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 1975. 
Patapan, Haig. '"Lord over the Children of Pride': The Vaine-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes s 
Leviathan." Philosophy and Rhetoric 33, no. 1 (2000): 74—93. 
Plato. "Republic, Volume I: Books 1-5." In Loeb Classical Library 237, edited by Christopher 
Emlvn-Jones and William Preddy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 197 L 
Scott, John T. "Godolphin and the Whale: Friendship and the Framing of Hobbes' Leviathan." 
In Love and Friendship: Rethinking Politics and Affection in Modern Times, edited by 
Eduardo A. Veldsquez, 120. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. 
Slomp, Gabriella. "From Genus to Species: The Unravelling of Hobbesian Glory." History of 
Political Thought 19 (1998): 559. 
. Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory. London: Macmillan, 2000. 
Strauss, Leo. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis. Translated by Elsa M. 
Sinclair. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
Thomas, Keith. "Social Origins of Hobbes' Political Thought." In Hobbes Studies, edited by 
Keith Brown, 185. Oxford: Blackwell, 1965. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Translated by Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
Tuck, Richard. Philosophy and Government 1572—1651. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
Walzer, Michael. "Good Aristocrats / Bad Aristocrats: Thomas Hobbes and Early Modern 
Political Culture." In In the Presence of the Past, edited by R.T. Bienvenu and M. Feingold, 
46. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1991. 
